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The Public Offering and a Quest for
Alternatives
Bart A. Brown, Jr., CliJJbrd A. Roe, Jr. and Scott B. Crooks*
I. INTRODUCTION
The year 1969 has seen a continuation of the strong new issues
market that has commanded a significant portion of the attention of
the investing public over the past few years. As a result, more and more
closely held companies are seeking to raise funds through public
offerings of their stock and thus share in the successes of this strong
market. While the market conditions have been most encouraging,
there have been other developments that have made the managements
of some closely held companies reconsider the relative advantages and
disadvantages of going public. Recent court decisions have strictly
defined the legal responsibilities and potential liabilities of management
of publicly held companies. The costs of going public, both in money
and in the time of management, have also steadily increased. Moreover,
these trends seem likely to continue as more extensive reporting
requirements are applied to public companies under the federal
securities laws.
What is the real substance of these new cases and the costs of
being a publicly held company? What is behind the furor over such
cases as BarChris,' Globus2 and Texas Gulf Sulphur?3 Are accountants,
underwriters, lawyers, and corporate executives now required to meet
impossible standards in the preparation of a registration statement and
are they subject to substantial liabilities for any failure to fulfill these
standards? Perhaps most importantly, how do these new developments
affect the varied and interdependent questions and considerations
against which a decision to go public has traditionally been measured?
The purpose of this article is to answer some of these questions.
It will analyze the advantages and disadvantages of going public in the
* Members of the Ohio Bar and of the firm of Dinsmore, Shohl, Coates and Deupree,
Cincinnati, Ohio.
I. Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
2. Globus v. Law Research Serv. Inc., 287 F. Supp. 188 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), rev'd in part,
CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 92,474 (2d. Cir. Sept. 9, 1969).
3. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S.
976 (1969).
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context of these new cases and in the context of these increasing costs.
It will then compare the results of going public with the results
obtained by some other means of raising capital for closely held
companies. From these analyses the reader can reach some conclusions
as to the best course of action for his client or company to follow.
In this discussion, the focus of attention will be upon a small,
closely held hypothetical corporation called Essex Industries, Inc.
Essex is owned and operated by two stockholders whose wives and
children also hold nominal amounts of stock. Essex currently
maintains one plant, which also includes its executive offices. Its
owners are both early middle age, but several of their key
subordinantes are younger men, unrelated to the principals, who it is
felt must take leading roles in any expansion of the business.
For its last fiscal year, Essex had after-tax income of 800,000
dollars on sales of 7,000,000 dollars, representing a fifteen percent
increase in profits and an eighteen percent increase in sales over the
previous year. Its profits and sales have risen continuously in the past
five years, largely on the strength of aggressive marketing and the
development of cheaper, more durable materials for the company's
main product line.
The capacity of Essex's present facility has nearly been reached
and its present market area has been thoroughly exploited. There is
every reason to believe that an expansion of plant and market area
would result in continued growth. Realizing the various problems and
potentials inherent in their situation, the principals of Essex have
seriously considered taking their company public. They have had
preliminary discussions with a few investment banking concerns who
are willing to underwrite an offering for their company, but they are
also worried and perplexed as they ponder the time, expenses, and
liabilities involved in a public offering of their securities. They wonder
if there might not be a quicker, cheaper, and safer way to achieve the
same goals that would result from a public offering of Essex's stock.
In the discussion which follows, we shall examine the goals Essex
is seeking from an initial public offering of its securities and weigh the
benefits and detriments of public financing against the other
alternatives for raising capital. The alternatives to be considered will
include debt financing, private and intrastate placements of securities,
the "Regulation A" exemption, and various corporate combinations





A. The Advantages of a Public Offering
A public offering of securities has traditionally served several
primary functions for both the company and its stockholders. First and
foremost, it is a means for raising capital in substantial amounts from
the public at large. Although the purposes for which the proceeds of
the offering will be used vary from case to case, broad public support
for a venture is usually dependent on the proceeds being earmarked for
an expansion or diversification of the company's business.
Consequently, the primary purpose of an initial public offering of
securities is generally to raise substantial amounts of equity capital for
the corporation's use in the expansion and betterment of its business.
With this capital on hand, the corporation is given a new outlook
on corporate life. It is no longer solely dependent upon the mortgage
loan market for its capital needs or the banking community for its
working capital needs. With money in its pocket, a corporation, such
as Essex, is in a position to concentrate all its resources on the
development and improvement of its business.
Depending on the capital needs of Essex, its stockholders may also
recoup part of their original investments in the company by including
part of their shares in the offering. This is accomplished by a
"secondary offering" of some of their holdings, together with the stock-
of the company being sold. Such a combination will result in a
considerable savings of time, effort, and expense over the separate
transactions or series of transactions that would otherwise be,
necessary. Thus, through this combined offering; both Essex and its
stockholders can obtain liquid funds while the company can retain the
key personnel who have been responsible for its success.
Once the offering is completed, Essex has a marketable
commodity in its own stock, which has attained a readily. ascertainable
market value. As a result, Essex can seek to expand its business by
using either its newly-marketable stock or the cash it has obtained in
the public offering for acquisition purposes. Thus, Essex has become
considerably more flexible as to the direction in which it may move.
As a public company, Essex will be in a better position to attract
and retain highly qualified, key personnel, both on the strength of its
more widely established financial and business reputation and also on
its ability to offer a compensation package that includes definitively
valued securities. Whether the compensation package entails a deferred
compensation plan (pension or profit-sharing), a stock option or stock
19691
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purchase plan, or outright compensation in securities, the key factor
from the employee's standpoint will be the opportunity to share in the
growth and success of the company through the ownership of an equity
interest in the company.
With additional equity capital Essex will also find it easier to
borrow money through debt securities, mortgage and bank loans, and
lines of credit. Thus, its working capital situation, both short-term and
long-term, may be materially enhanced.
Many of the advantages sought by Essex in going public are
paralleled by similar advantages to its major shareholders. As holders
of a marketable security with a readily ascertainable value, the
shareholders are in a better position to sell or pledge their shares than
are the shareholders in a closely held corporation. Moreover, once their
investment in the company is converted from private to public
securities, the value of their investment may be more easily and
certainly established for federal estate tax purposes.
There are less obvious advantages of being public that Essex's
management and stockholders should not overlook. For example, once
a company has become publicly held, its prestige among its
competitors, customers, and the business community at large is
generally heightened. Because there is a public market in its securities,
there is a continuing interest on the part of the business community in
the affairs and achievements of the company. Similarly, the standards
that all public companies must meet instill greater confidence and trust
in the company on the part of the people who deal with it. The mere
fact that its name and the details of its business are published
throughout the business community will result in Essex's developing a
greater range of contacts throughout that community.
The investment banking firm that manages the first public offering
for Essex will also have a stake in its business and market success. As
a result, this investment banking firm will make a continuing effort to
"sell" the company and to promote its growth. In addition, the
company's association with its own investment banker may open up
new vistas of sophisticated corporate finance and expansion that Essex
and its management do not have the experience or time to develop for
themselves.
In summary, a public offering permits Essex and its shareholders
to raise more funds than can be obtained in any other manner; to
establish the widest possible public market for the Essex stock; and to
provide the company and its shareholders with the maximum possible
flexibility as to their future.
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B. The Disadvantages of a Public Offering
There are essentially four items to be considered as disadvantages
in going public. These are as follows: (1) the initial liabilities and
responsibilities of being a publicly held company; (2) the expenses
involved in a public offering; (3) the continuing record-keeping and
reporting responsibilities of a publicly held company; and (4) the
dilution of its equity and loss of its corporate privacy. Since each of
these is basically unrelated to the others, they will be discussed
separately.
1. Initial Liabilities.-As noted in the Introduction, there are
potential liabilities for those persons who participate in a public
offering on behalf of a company. These liabilities are imposed by the
Securities Act of 19331 and are both civil and criminal in nature.
The Act's civil liability provisions are sections 11, 12(1), and
12(2). Section II deals with liability for material misstatements or
omissions in a registration statement. Section 12(1) deals with liability
for offers or sales of unregistered securities which are required to be
registered under the Act. Section 12(2)' deals with liability for material
misstatements or omissions in connection with offers, or sales of any
securities, whether registered, unregistered or exempted from the
registration provisions of the Act.'
The Act's anti-fraud provisions are contained in section 17. Under
this section, it is made illegal to engage in any activity or employ any
device or scheme to defraud a purchaser of securities. This section
applies to all securities and to all transactions that meet the basic
4. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa (1964) [hereinafter cited as the 1933 Act, employing the section
numbers of the original public act].
5. 1933 Act § 12(2) provides: "Any person who-(2) offers or sells a security (whether or
not exempted by the provisions of section 3, other than paragraph (2) of subsection (a) thereof),
by the use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate
commerce or of the mails, by means of a prospectus or oral communication, which includes an
untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state a material fact necessary in order to make
the statements, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading (the
purchaser not knowing of such untruth or omission), and who shall not sustain the burden of
proof that he did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of such
untruth or omission, shall be liable to the person purchasing such security from him, who may
sue either at law or in equity in any court of competent jurisdiction, to recover the consideration
paid for such security with interest thereon, less the amount of any income received thereon, upon
tender of such security, or for damages if he no longer owns the security."
6. Although § 12(2) does not mention the exempt transactions of § 4, that section itself
specifically exempts those transactions only from the requirements of registration. The one
relatively unimportant exception in § 12(2) is for securities of governments and banks exempted
by § 3(a)(2). Section 3(a) exempts the securities named therein from all provisions of the Act,
unless otherwise expressly provided elsewhere in the Act.
1969]
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jurisdictional requirements of the 1933 Act. In this connection, all that
is required to meet the jurisdictional requirements for the application
of section 17 is the use of any means or instruments of transportation
or communication in interstate commerce or use of the mails. A
violation of this section may be remedied by a civil action,' by criminal
proceedings,8 or by an investigation by the SEC and the subsequent
institution of injunction proceedings.'
Sections 12(2) and 17 have extremely broad application and their
penalties are severe. They deal with all offers to sell securities within
the jurisdiction of the 1933 Act; therefore, their impact cannot be
avoided by seeking alternatives to a public offering. These sections
require that great care be taken in offering securities for sale, but their
restrictions are well-known, and tlhey have not been the basis of the
recent concern over the 1933 Act liabilities.
Section 12(1) is concerned directly with securities which must be
registered, and its coverage is likewise obvious and well-known. It is
similar to section 12(2), in that an action based on section 12(1) must
be brought by the person who purchases directly from the violator.'"
The clear warning of this section is that, if one wishes to rely on an
exemption from registration," he had better be sure that he qualifies
for it; there is always the possibility that a disappointed purchaser will
challenge his decision in court. A well-timed and' well-planned
registration, therefore, is the only way to avoid section 12(1) liability.
Any margifial use of an alternative procedure will carry the threat of
liability, at least until the statute of limitations has run.'2
7. See. e.g., Pfeffer v. Cressaty, 223 F. Supp. 756 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Schamber v. Aaberg,
186 F. Supp. 52 (D. Colo. 1960); Osborn v. Mallory, 86 F. Supp. 869 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
8. 1933 Act § 24 provides: "'Any person who willfully violates any of the provisions of this
title, or the rules and regulations promulgated by the Commission under authority thereof, or any
person who willfully, in a registration statement filed under this title, makes any untrue statement
of a material fact or omits to state any material fact required to be stated therein or necessary
to make the statements therein not misleading, shall upon conviction be fined not more than
$5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both."
9. 1933 Act § 20(b) provides that whenever it appears to the Commission that a person is
engaged or about to engage in acts in violation of the statute, it may bring an action in federal
district court to enjoin such acts.
10. 1933 Act § 12(l) provides that: "Any person who-() offers or sells a security in
violation of section 5 . . .shall be liable to the person purchasing such security from him, who
may sue either at law or in equity in any court of competent jurisdiction, to recover the
consideration paid for such security with interest thereon, less the amount of any income received
thereon, upon the tender of such security, or for damages if he no longer owns the security."
II. 1933 Act § 3 lists securities which are exempt from registration; § 4 exempts certain
transactions from registration.
12. 1933 Act § 13 provides for the limitation of actions under §§ II, 12(l) and 12(2). As
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It is section I I of the Act which has recently loomed large in the
thinking of the securities bar, the financial community, and the
business world. The touchstone for this widely discussed concern has
been the case of Escott v. BarChris Construction Corp.13 It is not the
purpose of this article to analyze this case in depth,14 but rather to
assess its practical impact on a company's decision to make a public
offering.
Under section 11, any person who acquires a security in
connection with a registration statement containing an untrue
statement of a material fact or a statement that is misleading because
of the omission of a material fact may sue, among others, every person
who signed the registration statement, every director of the issuer, every
accountant who certified part of the statement, and every underwriter
connected with the sale of the securities. In BarChris, an action under
section 11 was brought against the issuer, its directors and principal
executive officers, its controller, its underwriters, and its independent
accountants. All were found liable for signing a registration statement
which contained material misstatements and omissions of fact. In the
course of its opinion, the court pointed out that, under section 11, the
plaintiff need not prove that he relied on the false or misleading
information or that the defendant knew of the misstatement or
omission. The only defenses, according to the court, are that there was
no material misstatement or omission or that the defendant exercised
due diligence in determining the accuracy and completeness of the
registration statement." For reasons fully stated in its opinion, the
court found that the registration statement contained several material
misstatements and omissions and that the defendants did not exercise
due diligence.
to § 12(1) it provides that no action shall be maintained more than one year after the sale in
violation of § 5, and in no event more than 3 years after the security was offered to the public.
13. 283 F. Supp.643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
14. This case has been the subject of extensive comment and analysis. See. e.g. Proceedings,
American Bar Association, Section of Corporation, Banking & Business Law, The BarChris Case:
Prospectus Liability, 24 Bus. LAW 523 (1969); Wyant & Smith, BarChris: A Revaluation of
Prospectus Liability, 3 GA. L. REV. 122 (1969); Note, The Underwriter's Duty of "Due
Diligence" Under Section I1 of the Securities Act: Reflections on BarChris, 22 VAND. L. REV.
386 (1969).
15. Sections I I(b)(3)(A)-and (C) set forth the 2 defenses of "due diligence" which apply
to directors and officers of the issuer. Basically, these require a reasonable investigation and a
reasonable ground for believing that the registration statement contains no false or misleading
statements. In determining what is reasonable, the statute provides that "the, standard of




There is much in BarChris to arouse caution and doubt in the
professional securities community concerning the preparation of
registration statements. For Essex and those actually involved in its
operations who must sign the registration statement, the following rules
must be carefully followed: (1) Make every effort to determine the
exact status of every aspect of the business, including future plans. (2)
Give full and fair evaluations of each aspect of the business to the
persons responsible for preparing the registration statement or any part
thereof. (3) Answer completely and candidly all questions asked and
volunteer any information which may be relevant to the questions
asked, even though not directly called for. (4) In brief, be thorough,
be careful, and be candid.
Each director and officer of Essex should read each part of the
registration statement. If there are parts he does not understand, he
should have them clarified. Every director and officer, including
"outside" directors, should keep as fully informed as possible about
the company's operations, especially those described in the registration
statement. They should bear in mind that the law requires the
registration statement to be accurate as of the effective date, not merely
as of the date that it was compiled."8 Finally, at each reading of the
registration statement and at each discussion of its contents, they
should'ask themselves whether, under any possible construction or
under any conceivable circumstances, there has been any "material
misstatement or omission."
Thus, BarChris simply compels Essex and its officer-directors to
be thorough and truthful as to the information set forth in the
registration statement. Certainly, this is not an unreasonable burden to
impose upon them.
2. The Expenses of Going Public.-It will be expensive for Essex
to go public. The direct costs, not including the underwriting discounts
and commissions, of even a modest offering (up to five million dollars)
will be measured in the tens of thousands of dollars. In addition, the
underwriters' t6tal compensation may be as much as fifteen percent of
the offering, depending largely upon the extent of their commitment to
dispose of the issue and the degree of risk associated with the securities
themselves.
Among the more important items of direct costs are the legal
fees-both the company's and the underwriters'-for preparing the
registration statement and attending to a myriad of related details;
16. 1933 Act § 8.
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accounting fees for the certified financial statements; costs of printing
the registration statement, prospectuses and underwriting contracts;
registration and blue sky fees; and the initial fees to a registrar or
transfer agent. In addition, the underwriter may request that an
independent survey of Essex be made, and the cost of this survey must
be paid by the company. There may also be a "finder" who has
brought the company and the underwriter together and whose fee for
doing so may amount to perhaps two percent of the proceeds to the
company after underwriters' commissions. These fees, however, are
frequently included in the underwriters' commissions.
There will also be a substantial indirect cost to Essex in terms of
executive time, disruption of normal business, suspension of certain
corporate activities during the registration period, and rearrangement
of the corporate structure and certain corporate affairs to conform to
the standards necessary to take the company public. Company officials
should expect to spend from four to six months in preparing for the
offering; much time will be spent answering seemingly endless questions
and producing and analyzing countless documents-. Moreover, they
must continue to run the day-to-day affairs of the company with the
added burden of maintaining and, in some cases, rearranging its affairs
to meet the specifications described in the company's prospectus. In
many instances, plans for extraordinary corporate activities of Essex
will have to be suspended during the offering; such activities might
affect the carefully worded descriptions of the company's business, its
future plans, and its financial position as reflected in the registration
statement.
One area of concern to Essex will be the formalization of certain
corporate transactions and relationships with major suppliers,
customers, and corporate insiders. This may call for the repayment of
loans from the company to the insiders, or vice versa, the execution of
leases, contracts, bills of sale to cover certain business transactions, and
the execution of employment agreements with important executives. 7
The extent to which these costs will inhibit a company such as
Essex from going public will ultimately depend on whether a public
offering is otherwise desirable. These costs, although substantial, are
geared closely to the same forces which increase the economic benefits
of going public and, therefore, may be considered a constant factor.
17. For a consideration of the tax consequences of these problems, see Appert, Unwinding
or Formalizing Non-Arms-Length Transactions Between Affiliated Taxpayers, N.Y.U. 21ST
INST. ON FED. TAX. 1353 (1963).
1969]
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3. Continuing Liabilities, Duties, and Costs.-Once Essex
becomes publicly held there are certain continuing liabilities and
expenses that it must incur that would not be necessary if it continued
as a closely held company. Once its registration statement filed under
the 1933 Act becomes effective, it is required to file reports with the
Securities and Exchange Commission pursuant to section 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.18 These reports include the annual
10K report that must contain the certified financial statements of the
issuer for the year to which the report relates; the 9 K report, which is
a semi-annual report on the financial status of the company; and the
8K report, which must be filed at the end of any month in which
certain enumerated transactions take place. As the result of the Special
Disclosure Policy Study Report submitted to the Securities and
Exchange Commission in March, 1969, and the Commission's recent
proposed revisions of these reports, 9 Essex should expect that its
disclosure and reporting requirements, as a public company, will be
expanded substantially in the near future.
In addition to these required reports, Essex will be obligated either
by its underwriting agreements or by choice to mail financial
statements to its shareholders on an annual, semi-annual, or quarterly
basis. Its management will also be faced for the first time with the
obligation to submit their continued service in the company to a vote
of all of the shareholders when the time arrives to elect a new board
of directors. If the company becomes listed on a stock exchange or
reaches the stage where it has a million dollars in assets and over 500
shareholders, it has the obligation formally to register under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.20 This registration subjects the
company for the first time to the SEC's proxy rules21 and subjects its
"insiders" to the reporting requirements of section 16(a) and the short-
swing profits proscription of section 16(b) of the 1934 Act. 2 In
18. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-jj (1964) [hereinafter cited as 1934 Act, employing the section
numbers of the original public act].
19. SEC Exchange Act Release No. 8683 (Sept. 15, 1969); SEC Exchange Act Release No.
8682 (Sept. 15, 1969).
20. 1934Act §§ 12(a)&(g).
21. Section 14(a) of the 1934 Act provides that any proxy solicited in connection with a
security registered under the 1934 Act must contain the information prescribed in the rules enacted
by the Commission pursuant to this section. For the information required, see Rule 14(a)(1) -
(12), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14(a)(1)-(12) (1969).
22. Section 16(a) of the 1934 Act requires each officer and director of a company with an
equity security registered under § 12 of the 1934 Act, as well as each beneficial owner of more
than 10% of such a security, to file a report with the SEC as to his holdings of all the company's
[Vol. 23
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addition, the company must remember its responsibilities under Section
10(b) of the 1934 Act23 and Rule 10(b)-524 thereunder as to corporate
disclosure-the prompt and accurate disclosure of significant events in
its business which could affect the market value of its stock. The Texas
Gulf Sulphur2 case is an example of the potential liabilities under these
provisions. These various duties and statutory liabilities- will result in
additional expenses for Essex that were never a concern of the company
when privately held.
4. Dilution of Equity and Loss of Corporate
Privacy.-Concomitant with these increased corporate duties and the
continuing liabilities, another unattractive feature of becoming a public
company is the loss of identity between the original shareholders and
Essex. Going public means that they own less of the company and that
their continued control rests in part on the concurrence of the public
shareholders. Their continuing duties to the shareholders and to the
investing public entail a loss of corporate and, for the controlling
individuals, personal privacy. These factors and their impact on the
management of the company are very difficult to assess while the
company is privately held and call for psychological adjustments on the
part of key personnel-the company is no longer "mine" or "ours".
There are new routines to be established, new risks to be considered.
In all of these, the interests of the public shareholders of Essex must
equity securities and also to file a further report within 10 days after the end of any month in
which there has been any change in his holdings.
Section 16(b) provides that any profits realized by an officer, director or over-10%
shareholder of a company with an equity security registered under Section 12 from any purchase
and sale, or sale and purchase, of the company's equity securities within any 6-month period may
be recovered by the company. Suit for such a recovery may be brought by the company or by
one of its shareholders if the company fails to bring suit.
23. 1934 Act § 10(b) provides that: "It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or
indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or
of any facility of any national securities exchange . . .(b) To use or employ, in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange or any security
not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such
rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors."
24. Rule 10(b)-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1969), provides that: "It shall be unlawful for
any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate
commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange, (a) to employ
any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which
they were made, not misleading, or (c) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security."
25. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
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be considered. Thus management must learn to accept the opinions and
advice of outside directors without characterizing them as
"interference."
The dilution of the shareholders' equity in Essex must also be
measured in terms of a decreased share in the growth of the company,
perhaps not in absolute terms, but certainly as a percentage of the
whole. Moreover, management will undoubtedly want to share some of
this growth with the public shareholders through dividend distributions.
The SEC requires, however, that the prospectus limit the expectations
of prospective shareholders in this respect.2"
These are the major disadvantages to Essex and its shareholders
of a public offering of its stock. Against these management must weigh
the advantages of going public and make a decision. Before deciding
this question, however, management should be aware of the alternative
ways in which Essex can raise money. A comparison of the attributes
of these alternatives with the attributes of going public will more
clearly define the proper course of action.
III. ALTERNATIVES TO A PUBLIC OFFERING
A. Debt Financing
It should be emphasized that under normal circumstances a
company like Essex should defer a public offering of its stock until it
has exhausted its borrowing capabilities. It should use borrowed funds
as long as possible in an effort to build up its earnings per share. The
increased earnings per share will enhance the desirability of the
company's stock and the price it can command when it does become
necessary for the company to go to the public for equity financing.
Debt financing, therefore, is a most attractive alternative and should
normally be used by a company if it can raise the amount of money
needed.
The problem, however, is that the debt market in general is tight,
and it is particularly tight for closely held companies such as Essex.
Consequently, Essex will find it extremely difficult to raise substantial
sums of money by debt financing. Thus, unless Essex needs only a
small amount of capital, a public offering may be the next step for the
company to take.
B. Private Placements
A private placement involves the sale of a block of securities to a
26. See Guides for Preparation and Filing of Registration Statements, No. 26, SEC
Securities Act Release No. 4936 (Dec. 9, 1968).
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few well-chosen private investors. In the typical situation, the
purchasers are sophisticated investors who are reasonably well-
informed as to the affairs of the company. As a private placement, the
offering of the securities is exempt from registration under the 1933
Act.1
7
The principal advantages of a private placement to a company are
speed and lack of expense. All the details of the placement can be
handled by the company, its management, and its counsel. Whatever
disclosures as to the company's business that are made can be limited
to a relatively small group of persons who have a serious intention of
purchasing the securities offered. The company avoids all registration
and, following its offering, Essex will still be a private company.
From the viewpoint of Essex and its shareholders, the private
placement involves both practical and legal difficulties. As to the
practical problems, first, the shareholders must surrender part of their
equity ownership in Essex, yet they will not obtain the benefit of a
public market for the remainder of their stock. Secondly, in most
instances the net price Essex will receive for its stock in a private
placement will be less than the amount it would receive in a public
offering. This is to be expected since the investor is unwilling to pay
as much for the non-marketable security he receives in a private
placement as he would pay for the marketable security he receives in a
public offering. Thirdly, the private placement concentrates a
substantial block of Essex's stock in the hands of a few people who
are a potential threat to the present management. Lastly, many private
placements require a voice in management for the private investors. If
these management rights are substantial, they can seriously restrict the
powers of existing management to carry out the objectives sought
through the private placement.
The legal problems are generally involved. Essentially, they involve
the following three questions: (1) the size of offering that can qualify
as a private placement; (2) the intent that is necessary on the part of
the purchaser to preserve the exemption; and (3) the extent that Essex
can control the further sale of its stock once it is in the hands of the
private investors.
The size of offering that can qualify as a private placement will
depend upon the particular facts of each case. Thus the only certain
way to proceed (if the transactions could in any way be questionable)
27. 1933 Act § 4(2) provides that: "The provisions of section 5 shall not apply to . . .
(2) transactions by an issuer not involving any public offering."
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is to obtain a "no action" ruling from the Division of Corporate
Finance of the SEC. In considering such requests, the Division will
consider the following criteria: (1) the number of offerees and their
relationship to each other and to the issuer; (2) the number of units
offered; (3) the size of the offering; and (4) the manner of the offering. 8
It should be emphasized that it is the number of offerees, not
purchasers, that is considered under (1) above. Obviously, if a company
is interested in establishing a wide market for its securities, this
exemption becomes less applicable as the desired market grows larger.
Similarly, the more remote an offeree is from the affairs of the
company or its principals, the more likely it is that he will be deemed
a member of the "public."
The number of units and the amount of the offering are likely to
be in direct proportion to the number of offerees. If large quantities
or large amounts of securities are offered to a few persons, it is likely
those persons will be familiar enough with the operations of the
company that the size and amount will be discounted. The reverse of
this situation, however-a small number or amount of securities
offered to a great number of people-is much less likely to qualify for
a private exemption. In summary, the securities laws are designed to
protect the public at large. Consequently, if the securities are offered
to people who are not well-informed as to the affairs of the company,
it is unlikely that the private placement exemption will apply.
The intent that is necessary on the part of the investor to preserve
the exemption is well established. If the intention of the investor in
buying the securities is not "investment," but "distribution," the
exemption is lost. Prior to the decision of the SEC in The Crowell-
Collier Publishing Company case,2" it was assumed that a company
could protect itself by requiring the purcfiaser to give a written
affirmation of his intent to hold for investment. This was known as the
"investment letter." The Crowell-Collier case held, however, that the
private placement exemption could not be gained by the mere
"formality of obtaining investment representations."3' Thus to protect
itself Essex should place transfer restrictions directly on the face of the
stock certificates sold in any private placement.
Finally, the law requires a "change of circumstances" before a
purchaser of investment securities can resell them. This raises the
28. SEC Securities Act Release No. 285 (Jan. 24, 1935); SEC Securities Act Release No,
4552 (Nov. 6, 1962).




question of what circumstances are relevant and to what extent
circumstances must change. The answers to these questions will depend
largely on each individual case. It is safe to say that the mere passage
of time will not establish a conclusive presumption of a -change in
circumstances, but the investment community seems to agree that
holding for two to three years provides at least the basis of a reasonable
margin of safety for those purchasers desiring to sell their securities.
In an attempt to remedy the uncertainty presently attending the resale
of privately placed securities, the Commission has proposed sweeping
rule changes." First, there is a new, objective definition of the term
"distribution" which would apply to the resale of securities purchased
in private offerings. If the securities involved are those of a company
currently reporting its affairs to the SEC under sections 13 or 15(d) of
the 1934 Act, they may be resold to the public one year after purchase,
provided the sale is not too large to be absorbed into the market and,
provided further, that no extraordinary commissions are required to
sell the securities. The criteria for meeting the provisos are basically
those of the present Rule 154,32 with certain modifications.
If the issuer is not a "reporting company," the securities it places
privately are "restricted securities." Under the new proposals, such
securities would have to be held at least five years before they could
be resold to the public without registration. The SEC might prescribe
a longer period if it considers 'it necessary for investor protection.
Thus, "investment intent" and "change of circumstances" become
irrelevant.
These new proposals obviously put a premium on compliance with
the reporting requirements of the 1934 Act. Although a company may
voluntarily register to file such reports, even though not required to do
so, one result of the new proposals, if accepted, would undoubtedly be
to increase the attractiveness of going public.
The above discussion should make it clear that Essex, in making
a private placement of its securities, does so at some risk and
inconvenience to itself. Moreover, these detriments increase as it
attempts to enlarge its offering. Unless it has limited capital
requirements or unless an institutional investor or a small number of
informed individual investors can be found, this exemption from
registration will probably not serve the general goals usually associated
with going public.
3 1. SEC Securities Act Release No. 4997 (Sept. 15, 1969).
32. 17 C.F.R. § 230. 154 (rev. ed. 1969).
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C. The Intrastate Exemption
If the management of Essex feels that its goals would not be served
by a private placement of its securities, the sale of its securities
exclusively to those resident in the state of its incorporation and
principal place of business may be considered.
The 1933 Act exempts from registration "[a]ny security which is
a part of an issue offered and sold only to persons resident within a
single State or Territory, where the issuer of such security is a person
resident and doing business within, or, if a corporation, incorporated
by and doing business within, such State or Territory. '33 The SEC has
stated:
The legislative history of the Securities Act clearly shows that this exemption was
designed to apply only to local financing that may be practically consummated
in its entirety within the State or Territory in which the issuer is both incorporated
and doing business.
The intrastate offering is reasonably inexpensive and quick. It is
in a sense, however, a "public" offering in that the securities may, be
offered to large numbers of people who have no previous relationship
to the issu&r. Therefore, there is more likely to be an offering circular
and other sales literature distributed in connection with the sale. The
exemption is not lost by the use of the mails or other instruments of
interstate commerce so long as the solicitation makes it absolutely clear
that the securities are being offered and will be sold only to residents
of the particular state involved.
Again, there are practical and legal limitations on the ability of a
company like Essex to raise capital under this exemption. Obviously,
the primary disadvantage is the practical limitation on the amount of
funds a company can raise in a single state. Unless the amount that
can be raised meets the company's needs, it Ibust seek another route
to meet its capital requirements. Secondly, the company must verify the
residence of each purchaser of its stock in an intrastate transaction .3
If any stock is sold to a non-resident, this exemption will be lost.
Thirdly, the company must be incorporated and doing a substantial
portion of its business in the state in which the offering takes place.:"
Fourthly, the offering cannot be a part of a larger financing plan
involving a past, present, or future interstate sale of securities. If it is,
33. 1933 Act § 3(a)(Il).
34. SEC Securities Act Release No. 4434 (Dec. 6, 1961).
35. SEC Securities Act Release No. 4434 specifies that for the purposes of the exemption
"residence" means "domicile."
36. Id. See also SEC v. Truckee Showboat, Inc., 157 F. Supp. 824 (S.D. Cal. 1957).
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all the offerings will be integrated and the intrastate exemption will not
apply to any part of the transactionY.3  Finally, and most importantly,
the original offering may become disqualified subsequent to the
offering by the later resale of these securities across state lines.',
Thus, a successful intrastate offering requires not only a sizable
original market but also a sufficient local interest to maintain a viable
after-market within the state. A company such as Essex will have
substantial practical problems in attaining these market conditions
except possibly with respect to a very small issue. Moreover, because
of the threat of integration, use of the exemption could actually harm
a company's long-range financing programs.
D. Regulation A
If the capital needs of Essex are not substantial, it might consider
taking advantage of a rather simple procedure under the 1933 Act to
raise a quick 300,000 dollars. Regulation A,3 promulgated pursuant to
section 3(b) of the 1933 Act,40 provides a procedure whereby interstate
public offerings of not more than 300,000 dollars in any one year may
be made without registering the securities. As with other exemptions,
the burden of proving its availability is on the company, but unlike the
others, a Regulation A exemption requires affirmative action with the
SEC before an offering may be made. The company must prepare and
file with a Regional Office of the SEC all the required information that
enables the SEC to determine the availability of the exemption. An
offering circular containing certain required information about the
company, its financial situation and the offering itself must also be
37. SEC Securities Act Release No. 4434 provides in part: "Any one or more of the
following factors may be determinative of the question of integration: (I) [a]re the offerings part
of a single plan of financing; (2) do the offerings involve issuance of the same class of security;
(3) are the offerings made at or about the same time; (4) is the same type of consideration to be
received, and (5) are the offerings made for the same general purpose."
38. How long one must safely wait to sell so that his sale is not deemed part of the
distribution process is a matter of some debate. Set, H. SOWARDS. THE FEDERAL SECURITIES
ACT § 3.12[61[b] (1963); Wander, Book Review, 23 Bus. LAW. 1237, 1238-39 (1968). The view
which cautions a wait long enough to raise at least a presumption of a "change in circumstances"
seems the most sound.
39. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251-.263 (rev. ed. 1969).
40. 1933 Act § 3(b): "The Commission may from time to time by its rules and
regulations, and subject to such terms and conditions as may be prescribed therein, add any class
of securities exempted as provided in this section, if it finds that the enforcement of this
subchapter with respect to such securities is not necessary in the public interest and for the
protection of investors by reason of the small amount involved or the limited character of the
public offering; but no issue of securities shall be exempted under this subsection where the
aggregate amount at which such issue is offered to the public exceeds $300,000."
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filed with the SEC and distributed to each purchaser in the offering.
Secondary offerings by insiders may amount to as much as 100,000
dollars of the yearly total.
The principal advantage of the Regulation A offering is that it can
be handled more expeditiously and at less cost than a public offering.
Although an offering circular must be used in connection with such an
offering, the information required is substantially less than that
required to be contained in a prospectus used in connection with a
public offering.
The disadvantage of the Regulation A offering is, of course, the
small amount of capital that a company can raise through it.
Undoubtedly, for a medium-sized, growing company such as Essex the
yearly limit of 300,000 dollars would be too restrictive to provide the
capital necessary for sustained growth or to maintain the strong after-
market necessary to continue the promotion of the company to the
public.
E. "Instant Public"
The principal shareholders of Essex may want to consider using a
technique, often called "instant public," that allows a company's
securities to be publicly traded and, in effect, allows the company to
become publicly held, without the registration of its securities under the
1933 Act. The technique involves combining a private company with a
public company in such a way that the private company is the surviving
company and is able to succeed to the latter company's public position.
Essex's best use of this alternative might be to buy any one of the
numerous "shell corporations,"'" many with over 1,000 shareholders,
offered for sale in the classified ads of the leading financial newspapers
and periodicals and consider a combination resulting in the transfer of
Essex's business to the shell. The advantages would be that trading in
the stock of the "new Essex" would begin immediately and would pave
the way for a later offering of its stock, perhaps at a much higher price.
The stock of Essex owned by the principals would immediately have a
determinable value, and the company might achieve some of the side
advantages of a public company.
One of the major disadvantages of this technique is that, although
the company becomes publicly held much quicker and cheaper than is
possible through a registration, no capital is raised since there is no sale




of its securities involved. The equity of the company, however, is
immediately diluted. Hence a further offering will still be needed to
raise capital for the company.
Another disadvantage of the "instant public" technique is the
published position of the SEC concerning the legality of this technique
under the Federal securities laws. In a recent release,42 the Commission
cited two examples and gave a stern warning to the public and to
brokers and dealers that the use of these techniques could involve
violations of the registration requirements of the 1933 Act and the anti-
fraud and anti-manipulative provisions of both the 1933 and 1934 Acts.
The Commission's first example deals with an inactive private
company that issues its shares to a publicly-owned company for
nominal consideration. The public company subsequently spins these
shares off to its shareholders with the result that active trading in the
shares begins without any information on the new public company
available to the investing public. In the release, the Commission takes
the position that the sale by the private company of its shares to the
public company is a "sale" within the meaning of the 1933 Act, and
that, if the shares are subsequently spun off by the public company, it
may be a statutory underwriter within section 2(11) of the 1933 Act.
The Commission admits that while the initial spin off to the acquiring
company's shareholders may not constitute a distribution for purposes
of the 1933 Act, the entire process, including the redistribution of the
securities in the trading market, which can certainly be anticipated and
which may be the only purpose of the spin off, may have that effect.
Moreover, subsequent transactions in these shares by dealers would be
subject to section 5 of the 1933 Act requiring the delivery of a
prospectus during the periods set forth in section 4(3) of the Act.43
In reaching its conclusion, the Commission noted that the theory
is often advanced that since there is no actual sale involved in the
distribution of the shares in the spin off, registration of the shares is
not required, and that even if technically required, no purpose would
be served thereby since the persons who receive the shares in the spin
42. SEC Securities Act Release No. 4982 (SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8638)
(July 2, 1969).
43. Section 4(3) exempts from the prospectus requirements of § 5 of the Act transactions
executed by a dealer after the expiration of 40 days from the effective date of the registration
statement involved, or from the date on which the securities were bona ide offered to the public,
whichever date is later. In the case of securities which have not been previously sold pursuant to
an earlier registration statement, the period is extended to 90 days. The corollary to this
exemption is that the prospectus requirements of § 5 of the Act must be complied with during
the applicable 40 or 90 day period. 1933 Act § 4(3).
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off are not required to make an investment judgment. In dismissing this
argument, the Commission stated:
This reasoning fails, however, to take into account that there is a sale by the
issuer and the distribution thereafter does not cease at the point of receipt by the
initial distributees of the shares but continues into the trading market involving
sales to the investing public at large. Moreover, it ignores what appears to be
primarily the purpose of the spin off in numerous circumstances which is to create
quickly, and without the disclosure required by registration, a trading market in
the shares of the issuer. Devices of this kind, contravene the purpose, as well as
the specific provisions, of the Act which, in the words of the statutory preamble,
are 'to provide full and fair disclosure of the character of the securities sold in
interstate and foreign commerce and through the mails, and to prevent frauds in
the sale thereof.' In the circumstances of a spin off, when the shares are thereafter
traded in the absence of information about the issuer, the potential for fraud and
deceit is manifest.44
It does not appear that the Commission's legal conclusion would
be changed even if the company whose securities were spun off were a
profitable, active company like Essex, whose management would
probably make a concerted effort after the initial distribution to
disclose all pertinent information concerning its business affairs to the
public. The fact would still remain that such a distribution involves the
participation of a statutory underwriter. The Commission would
therefore probably require that the shares distributed be registered
under the Act.
Although it seems possible that an instant public technique
designed to counter the Commission's legal objections could be devised
by Essex, the basic disadvantages of the procedure cannot be avoided;
the technique still fails to fulfill the primary purpose of a public
offering-the raising of capital for the corporation. As a result, the
various instant public procedures currently being used are not valid
alternatives to a public offering since they are not financing techniques,
but market techniques.
To illustrate this legal objection, the Commission cites the case in
which promoters acquire the control of an inactive public shell with a
view towards quickly increasing the market value of their
shareholdings. Spurious assets are transferred to the corporation in
exchange for substantial amounts of newly issued shares. The
"acquisitions" of the corporation are highly publicized to stimulate
interest in the shares of the company. After the market price is
artificially inflated by these activities, the promoters dispose of their




stock. It is obvious that the Commission feels that such a, technique
involves serious violations of the anti-fraud and anti-manipulative
provisions of the 1934 Act and the registration provisions of the 1933
Act.
F. Disposition of the Company by Merger, Consolidation, or Sale
The complete disposition of a company by its controlling
shareholders or its combination with another enterprise may at first
seem remote from the primary goals of going public, almost all of
which are centered around continued control of the business by the
original owners. But many of those who begin by thinking of selling a
portion of their company to the public end up by selling all of it to
another corporation or group of interests. By so doing, they convert
their ownership interest into cash or shares of a more diversified
business. At the same time, management frequently remains in
operating control of their former company in its new status as a
subsidiary or division. Moreover, through use of stock of the acquiring
corporation, this result can usually be accomplished tax-free at a small
fraction of the cost of making a public offering. Of course, the single,
foremost disadvantage of this course of action will be that the
stockholders and management lose direct control and ownership of
their company. Therefore this is not an attractive route for. those who
have an overriding desire to manage their own public company.
IV. CONCLUSION
Let us return to the executive suite of Essex Industries to see how
the company's management have benefited from our discussion. The
stated purposes of this discussion were (1) to examine the relative
advantages and disadvantages of going public and (2) to compare these
results with the results of other alternatives for raising capital.
As set forth in Section II, there are many substantial advantages
that Essex can obtain from going public. In doing so, management
subjects itself to new responsibilities and potential liabilities, but these
can be endured if management is willing to exercise the care that
corporate directors are expected to exercise. Substantial costs will be
incurred in going public but these must be measured, not in absolute
amounts, but in relation to the financial benefits derived by the
company from a public offering of its securities. In summary, a
successful public offering for Essex will result in its raising a
substantial amount of equity capital which will enhance the continued
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expansion of the company and will provide a wide-spread, viable after-
market for the continued promotion of the securities of the company.
None of the alternatives will permit the raising of as much capital
for Essex as a successful public offering will provide. Moreover, none
of them will provide for a strong after-market for the company's stock.
The costs incurred in carrying out any of the alternatives will
undoubtedly be less, but in relation to the benefits obtained, they will
probably be disproportionately higher. As to liabilities, it seems that
the legal problems of the alternatives are equally as hazardous as the
public offering, particularly when the problems of compliance with the
securities laws are considered.
